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I. INTRODUCTION
Most people would think that a child’s best interest would be to
live with the biological mother and biological father under one roof
as one big happy family. Although this might be ideal, this is not
always possible. Many families with children separate all around the
world and go through challenging custody battles. In most situa-
tions, each party will claim that he or she should be granted sole
custody or designated as the domiciliary parent1 because it would be
* J.D./D.C.L. candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University. The author would like to give special thanks to Professor Carter
and Professor Ryan for their assistance, wisdom, and support throughout the writ-
ing of this case note.
1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335(B) (2018) defines domiciliary parent with
the following implication:
(2) The domiciliary parent is the parent with whom the child shall pri-
marily reside, but the other parent shall have physical custody during
time periods that assure that the child has frequent and continuing contact
with both parents.
(3) The domiciliary parent shall have authority to make all decisions af-
fecting the child unless an implementation order provides otherwise. All
major decisions made by the domiciliary parent concerning the child
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in the child’s best interest. On the other hand, there are some bio-
logical parents who see themselves as unfit to take care of their child
at the moment and grant permission for the child to stay with a non-
parent because it would be in the child’s best interest. Often times,
it is in the child’s best interest to stay with a nonparent. However,
parents have superior rights in most cases. The case of Tracie F. v.
Francisco D.2 confronts this issue by looking through the lenses of
whether a child should be moved from what is generally viewed as
the stable and long-lasting environment provided by a nonparent
who has been awarded custody as a domiciliary parent. In this case,
the Louisiana Supreme Court examines the issue by employing the
best-interest-of-the-child doctrine to clarify the different approaches
that appellate courts have developed in similar situations and to 
come to a conclusion that will be in the best interest of the child in 
the case.
II. BACKGROUND
There is a lot of law on the best-interest-of-the-child standard in 
state, federal, and international law. In regard to efforts which have
been implemented internationally for the rights of children, in 1989,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child was approved in New
York by the United Nations. The treaty sets out the civil, political,
economic, social, health, and cultural rights of children. Article 3
states that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, admin-
istrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration.”3 This concept has been an-
alyzed and applied in various cases in Louisiana, including the in-
stant case. This matter entails a custody dispute between a biological
shall be subject to review by the court upon motion of the other parent.
It shall be presumed that all major decisions made by the domiciliary
parent are in the best interest of the child.
2. Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 188 So. 3d 231 (La. 2016).
3. UN General Assembly, Convention on The Rights of The Child at art. 3,
(United States, November 1989), available at https://perma.cc/GV6E-JVGF.
       
 
 
 
      
     
          
           
        
       
        
      
       
       
    
        
  
     
       
      
          
       
        
         
       
         
         
          
                                                                                                         
         
              
         
          
              
             
             
             
            
           
              
             
        
3072019] TRACIE F. V. FRANCISCO D.
father and a maternal grandmother, who had been named as the
domiciliary parent in a consent judgment.4 
On May 29, 2006, D. was born to Tracie F., who was unmarried.
Tracie indicated that D.’s father was Francisco D., who was in his
early 30s.5 Tracie and Francisco have never lived together, nor have
they ever been in a committed relationship. After Tracie gave birth
to D., Tracie filed a petition for sole custody or, alternatively, for
joint custody with Francisco but with Tracie being named as the
domiciliary parent. On January 7, 2007, by stipulated judgment,6 the
court granted joint custody, naming Tracie as the domiciliary parent.
Francisco was awarded reasonable visitation and was ordered to pay
$400 per month in child support and to sustain health insurance on
the child.
By all accounts, including his own stipulation, Francisco had 
very little interaction with D. in D.’s upbringing for about the first
seven years of D.’s life. During that time, Francisco rarely exercised 
his visitation rights and had not taken a role in D.’s educational de-
velopment. However, Tracie also had proved to be less than a model
parent. When D. was still an infant, Tracie placed many of the re-
sponsibilities on her mother, Kathy B., and stepfather, Michael B.
without giving them legal rights. Thus, they acted as de facto par-
ents.7 Additionally, when D. was about six months old, Tracie and
D. moved into Kathy and Michael’s house for an extended period of
time. As D. grew beyond infancy, so did Kathy and Michael’s role
4. Although the underlying reasons were uncertain from the record before
the court, the court adhered to the appellate court’s attempts to conceal the identity
of the litigants and the minor child in the court’s opinion.
5. As a child born from unmarried parents, D. had been “formally acknowl-
edged by both parents.” See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 184, 186, 196 (2019).
6. A stipulated judgment is a type of custody award which a court renders
when the parties consent to a custodial arrangement and there is no evidence of
parental fitness from either party. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335 (2019).
7. See De Facto Parent Information (JV-295), Advokids, at https://perma
.cc/DFR3-73E5. A de facto parent is an individual who assumes, on a day-to-day
basis, the role of a parent for the child. This person fulfills the child’s physical
and psychological needs for the care and affection of the child. Also, this person
assumes that role for a substantial period.
        
 
 
 
         
        
      
       
       
         
        
       
      
      
      
      
       
    
      
    
    
       
      
       
     
        
        
      
         
     
        
         
 
                                                                                                         
          
    
    
    
    
308 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
in the development of D. Kathy and Michael sent D. to a private
school, and Kathy paid the tuition. Michael was the coach for D.’s
baseball team. Also, Kathy and Michael cultivated D.’s religious up-
bringing and supported his participation in cub scouts.8 The record
was uncertain as to whether Francisco fulfilled all of his child sup-
port obligations. However, it established that out of the payments
which Francisco did make Tracie did not give any portion of them
to Kathy or Michael. Thus, Kathy and Michael handled the bulk of
the financial responsibilities when they cared for D.9 
In the beginning of 2013, Kathy became concerned about
Tracie’s behavior, including her supervision of D. Through counsel,
Kathy contacted Francisco to inform him of her concerns about
Tracie’s behavior. Kathy’s counsel informed Francisco that Tracie
was involved in a physically abusive relationship and had begun
abusing drugs. Kathy suggested that D. be removed from Tracie’s
custody and Francisco agreed. On May 28, 2013, Francisco joined 
Kathy in a pleading styled “Petition to Change Custody to Non-Par-
ent and Petition of Intervention for Custody of Minor Child.”10 Con-
currently with the joint petition, a proposed order was submitted 
which granted Kathy with temporary custody with a rule to show
cause why Francisco should not be relieved of child support obliga-
tions “with the change in custody to Kathy.”11 The district court im-
posed the temporary order. Tracie was designated as a defendant in
Kathy and Francisco’s petition. Subsequently, on July 18, 2013, all
three parties agreed to a decree by which D. was permanently re-
moved from Tracie’s custody and joint custody was granted to
Kathy and Francisco. By the same stipulated judgement, Kathy was
named as the domiciliary parent and Francisco was not required to
pay child support.12 
8. Tracie F., 188 So. 3d at 236.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. 
12. Id.
       
 
 
 
       
      
        
       
         
      
     
    
         
            
    
         
        
     
         
        
        
       
          
    
      
      
         
         
      
            
       
         
       
                                                                                                         
      
    
    
    
             
               
3092019] TRACIE F. V. FRANCISCO D.
On August 7, 2014, Francisco filed an “Amended Rule to
Change Custody, Set Visitation and Other Relief and Memorandum
of Law to Exception of No Cause of Action.”13 Francisco’s pleading 
was prefaced with the statement that “circumstances have changed
to such a material extent and degree affecting the welfare of the child
to warrant a modification of custody.”14 Francisco alleged that
Kathy had not provided him with any information about D.’s health,
education, and welfare. Francisco contended that D. had expressed 
a strong interest to stay with him and that he wanted sole custody 
because he as a biological father had a paramount parental right over
Kathy, a nonparent.
Francisco’s rule to change was referred to a hearing officer who
found that there had not been any material circumstances that had 
changed since the stipulated judgment. Based on the officer’s in-
structions, Francisco’s request to change custody was set for trial
because his request was “such a profound step” that to do so would
require a trial before a district judge.15 Both Kathy and Francisco 
filed separate pretrial memoranda, and each argued that the other
party had the burden of proof. However, the district court had not
indicated which party had the burden of proof. Francisco and Kathy
both presented evidence of their current and extensive involvement
in D.’s life and upbringing, with Francisco indicating that he became
actively involved in D.’s life only within the past year.16 At the con-
clusion of the trial, the district court awarded sole custody to Fran-
cisco and indicated that Kathy had the burden of proof, but failed to
meet her burden of proving that if the father had custody of the mi-
nor, the child would sustain substantial harm.17 The court expressed 
that the evidence adduced at trial proved that D. would be in a loving 
and structured environment under the biological father’s care.18 The
13. Id. at 237.
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 237-38 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2019)).
18. Id. at 238 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131, et seq. (2019)).
        
 
 
 
      
     
           
          
         
          
        
     
      
     
         
      
         
        
       
      
    
       
          
       
           
          
      
          
           
      
     
       
                                                                                                         
            
    
    
         
       
310 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
court further recognized Francisco’s paramount right to custody of
his child.19 Subsequently, Kathy appealed.
In a split decision, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fifth
Circuit determined that Francisco had the burden of proof to show
“rehabilit[ation]” to be currently fit to be designated as a domiciliary 
parent and to prove that the environment provided by Kathy as the
present domiciliary parent had “materially changed.”20 Thus, the ap-
pellate court’s majority reinstated the “stipulated judgment award-
ing joint custody to Kathy and Francisco, with Kathy designated as
the domiciliary parent.”21 Francisco then sought review by the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court. The court granted a writ to determine the
standard for adjudicating a request for increased custodial rights
brought by a biological parent who shared joint custody with a
grandparent, and the biological parent had earlier stipulated that the
grandparent should be designated as having the rights and responsi-
bilities of a domiciliary parent.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision was guided by Title V,
Book I, of the Louisiana Civil Code article 131 and the legislative
comments to its revision. Article 131 indicates that “[i]n a proceed-
ing for divorce or thereafter, the court shall award custody of a child
in accordance with the best interest of the child.”22 The court con-
cluded that the legislative comments to article 131 were immensely 
instructive for this case and that according to the 1993 Revision 
Comment (a), “the best interest of the child [is] the overriding test
to be applied in all child custody determinations.”23 Further, the
court acknowledged Revision Comment (d) in article 131, which 
states that “[t]his Article should be followed in actions to change
19. Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2019)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 (2019).
23. Id. at comment (a).
       
 
 
 
            
        
         
          
      
        
       
          
       
       
     
      
       
           
       
        
     
   
        
       
          
           
           
             
      
          
        
        
         
       
      
     
                                                                                                         
       
          
      
3112019] TRACIE F. V. FRANCISCO D.
custody as well as in those to initially set it.”24 Therefore, relying on
these comments, the court held that the primary consideration in a
determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. Spe-
cifically, in this case, since the original custody decree was a stipu-
lated judgment, the court further held that:
[A] biological parent with joint custody, who seeks modifi-
cation of a stipulated custody award to obtain greater custo-
dial rights, must prove: 1) that there has been a material
change of circumstances since the original custody decree
was entered; and 2) that the proposed modification is in the
best interest of the child.25 
With this being said, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded 
that the appellate court committed legal error in choosing the stand-
ard it did, for several reasons. First, the appellate court should have
applied the standard from article 131 and not the standard from arti-
cle 133. Second, the court explained that the heightened standard
chosen by the appellate court hinders—rather than advocates—the
best-interest-of-the-child standard. Further, the standard articulated 
by the appellate court curtails, rather than respects, the constitutional
rights of biological parents. The standard diminishes the constitu-
tional rights because the standard that was applied by the appellate
court does not even get to the analysis of the child’s best interest.
Thus, this deprives the biological parent from the right of proving
that it would be in the child’s best interest to have the biological
parent designated as the domiciliary parent. Therefore, the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court applied the correct standard (best interest of the
child) to the facts of this case.
Applying the first part of the standard of whether there had been 
a material change of circumstances since the original custody decree
was entered, the court held that Francisco had proven—by his shift
from minimal involvement to being integrally involved in the
child’s life—a material change in circumstances.26 Francisco had
24. Id. at comment (d).
25. Tracie F., 188 So. 3d at 235.
26. Id. at 247-248.
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frequent visitation with D. and even provided D. with his own bed-
room at Francisco’s home. Also, Francisco had afforded opportuni-
ties for religious growth which were complementary to the religious
traditions of D.’s early childhood upbringing. Further, Francisco had 
nurtured D.’s interest in hunting and fishing, and regularly commu-
nicated by phone with D. Applying the second part of the standard 
of whether it would be in the best interest of D. to change the cus-
tody decree, the court held that although Francisco’s recent involve-
ment with D. was commendable and was reflected in some of the
best interest of the child factors from article 134 in equipoise be-
tween Francisco and Kathy, several of the factors weighed in favor
of Kathy as the domiciliary parent as in D.’s best interest.27 Fran-
cisco was able to meet the factors of developing a loving and affec-
tionate relationship with D., but Kathy met those factors, and more,
because she was there for the majority of D.’s upbringing and pro-
vided for the necessities and stabilities which D. needed in his early
stages of life. Specifically, Kathy had the ability to provide D. with
a growing stable and adequate environment for D. to thrive in. Thus,
the court found that it was in the best interest of D. to reinstate the
stipulated judgment by which Francisco and Kathy share joint cus-
tody and Kathy was designated as the domiciliary parent.
Judge Crichton concurred in the result reached by the Louisiana
Supreme Court; however, in his view, Francisco had not demon-
strated a material change of circumstances sufficient enough to trig-
ger the second prong of the analysis applied by the court. Specifi-
cally, Judge Crichton expressed that Francisco’s recent efforts to
foster a relationship with D. did stand out compared to Francisco’s
earlier involvement with D. and would be considered a change in
circumstances. Yet, he believed that Francisco had not shifted his
behavior enough to be considered integrally involved in D.’s life.
Thus, Judge Crichton indicated that Francisco had not even met the
threshold of materiality.
27. Id. at 248-249.
       
 
 
 
  
        
    
          
          
      
           
        
          
         
   
   
       
       
       
           
      
       
           
            
       
      
       
       
         
        
      
        
        
                                                                                                         
             
          
   
3132019] TRACIE F. V. FRANCISCO D.
IV. COMMENTARY
This commentary will first provide a discussion on the court’s
application of the best-interest-of-the-child standard and how the
practice of this standard shapes the future development of the child.
Next, this commentary will look at a more thorough analysis of the
evidentiary standard required to be met for a nonparent to obtain 
joint or sole custody indicated in the code and how this standard is 
incompatible with society’s current custom. The Louisiana Supreme
Court did not address the ability of a parent to consent to a judgment
wherein the parent shares legal custody of a child with a nonparent.
A. Best-Interest-of-the-Child Standard
The best-interest-of-the-child standard applied in a custody case
where a biological parent is requesting increased custodial rights
with a grandparent, and the biological parent has earlier stipulated 
that the grandparent should be designated as the domiciliary parent
such as in this case, gives both parties the chance to fight for the
protection of the child. Child Welfare Information Gateway defines
“best interests” as the deliberation that courts undertake when de-
ciding what types of services, actions, and orders will best serve a
child as well as who is best suited to take care of a child. Other fac-
tors including the parent’s or caregiver’s circumstances and capacity
to parent, including the child’s ultimate safety and wellbeing, are
also taken into consideration. This standard is applied in all states,
the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.28 Other
countries which are part of the United Nations, including France and 
the United Kingdom, apply this standard as well.
The best-interest-of-the-child is codified in Title V, Book I of
the Civil Code. As article 131 explains, “[i]n a proceeding for
28. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Determining the Best Interests of the Child Report (2016), avail-
able at https://perma.cc/YC9N-Y5PV.
        
 
 
 
        
           
         
        
        
          
 
      
      
           
         
       
          
          
         
       
        
   
     
          
     
      
        
           
       
        
           
                                                                                                         
               
            
         
              
           
    
            
         
       
314 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
divorce or thereafter, the court shall award custody of a child in ac-
cordance with the best interest of the child.”29 According to the 1993
Revision Comment (a), “the best interest of the child [is] the over-
riding test to be applied in all child custody determinations.”30 Fur-
ther, Revision Comment (d) states that “[t]his Article should be fol-
lowed in actions to change custody as well as in those to initially set
it.”31 
Based on the code, the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly con-
cluded that the best-interest-of-the-child standard was the correct
standard that needed to be applied by the Louisiana Court of Appeal
for the Fifth Circuit in the instant case. Since Francisco D. wanted
to modify the stipulated judgement which he, Tracie F., and Kathy 
had agreed upon in the original consent decree, it was pertinent that
this standard was applied to these facts as required by article 131.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit decided to use a heightened standard under
article 133, which had imposed a greater burden on Francisco D.
than the burden of showing a material change of circumstances and
the best-interest-of-the-child standard articulated by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. This heightened standard required Francisco to
prove “rehabilit[ation]” to be currently fit to be designated as a dom-
iciliary parent and to prove that the environment provided by Kathy 
as the present domiciliary parent had “materially changed.”32 This
is a standard that was unfair to Francisco and created a roadblock
for Francisco to be able to prove that it was in D.’s best interest to 
stay with Francisco D. As the biological parent of D., Francisco 
needed to be given the utmost opportunity to prove to the court that
he deserved to have sole custody of his child, no matter whether he
29. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 (2019). The parties in this case ex-
pressed that they held onto their substantive rights, which were maintained under
the law in effect when the district court’s decision had been determined. Accord-
ingly, the law was applied in effect before January 1, 2016. Louisiana Civil Code
article 6 establishes, in part, that “[i]n the absence of contrary legislative expres-
sion, substantive laws apply prospectively only.”
30. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131, comment (a) (2019).
31. Id. at art. 131, comment (d).
32. Id. at art. 133.
       
 
 
 
            
      
       
         
      
       
         
         
          
       
     
      
       
 
       
       
       
             
        
         
           
       
           
      
             
         
     
      
            
      
      
                                                                                                         
               
            
3152019] TRACIE F. V. FRANCISCO D.
was going to prevail in the judgment or not. With the standard that
the Fifth Circuit had imposed, Francisco’s rights were being abated 
because he had constitutionally protected rights as a biological par-
ent in this matter regarding D. Specifically, the United States Con-
stitution provides a protection to biological parents: embedded in the
fourteenth amendment, parents are given the due process right to 
raise their children.33 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court
explained in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters that the liberty protected 
by the Due Process Clause provides that biological parents have the
protected right to control the upbringing and education of their
child.34 Thus, the application of the best-interest-of-the-child stand-
ard maintains this protected right, and the decision by the Louisiana
Supreme Court to apply it was consistent with article 131 in the 
code.
An innocent child who comes into the world deserves to be
placed in the most adequate and stable environment because the en-
vironment that a child is placed in during the child’s upbringing can 
have a major impact on the future development of the child. If the
child is placed in an unstable and risky environment, then the child’s
future development could be in jeopardy and the child could end up 
in a very bad situation. On the other hand, if a child is raised in a
positive and enriching environment, the child could have a prosper-
ous and successful life. Therefore, it is important to weigh all of the
factors mentioned in article 134, which the court applied in the in-
stant case to determine the best interest of the child. Some of these
factors include: (1) the love, affection, and other emotional ties be-
tween each party and the child; (2) the capacity and disposition of
each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care,
and other material needs; (3) the length of time the child has lived
in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintain-
ing continuity of that environment; and (4) the reasonable
33. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 549 (La. 1990).
34. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
        
 
 
 
            
        
        
     
         
          
         
           
     
     
    
             
    
         
       
      
           
      
          
       
         
    
           
       
        
     
     
           
       
      
              
     
                                                                                                         
          
316 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
preferences of the child, if the court deems the child to be of suffi-
cient age to express a preference.35 These factors along with the
other listed factors in article 134 truly allow an examination into the
relationship between the child and each party to determine who the
child is most compatible with and who can provide the child with
the most adequate and stable environment. This is why the code has
chosen this standard to govern situations like the present one to de-
termine what is truly in the best interest of the child. Thus, although
the application of the best-interest-of-the-child standard by the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court allowed Francisco to maintain his constitu-
tionally-protected right, the court correctly concluded that Francisco 
had not met his burden of proof that it was in the best interest of D.
to award sole custody to Francisco.
Tracie F. and D. had moved into Kathy’s and Michael’s house
when D. was only about six months old in 2006. During this time,
Tracie F. and Francisco D. had shared joint custody with Tracie F.
as the domiciliary parent. Thus, D. spent most of his time with
Tracie, Kathy, and Michael. Tracie and D. stayed with Kathy and 
Michael for an extended period of time, which led Tracie to defer
her main responsibilities as a mother to Kathy and Michael. This
situation went on for a couple of years during the time when Tracie
was involved in an abusive relationship and had been abusing drugs.
Thus, it was not in the best interest of D. to stay with her any longer
with her designated as the domiciliary parent because this would
have exposed D. to a risky situation. Although joint custody was
eventually transferred from Tracie F. and Francisco D. to Francisco 
D. and Kathy in 2013, with Kathy named as the domiciliary parent,
D. still spent most of his time with Kathy. Francisco was not re-
quired to give Kathy child support, with Kathy being a nonparent;
therefore, Kathy continued to handle the financial responsibilities
for D. By this time, D. was about eight years old and had spent his
childhood with Kathy as the primary caregiver. Francisco only
35. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 (2019).
       
 
 
 
        
      
      
            
          
       
         
       
        
         
        
     
    
      
               
        
           
         
       
           
         
      
       
   
       
         
     
          
         
          
                                                                                                         
          
3172019] TRACIE F. V. FRANCISCO D.
recently started to be consistent and active in D’s life the year before 
he filed for sole custody in 2014.
Although Francisco had started to become involved in D.’s life
and put effort in to create a stable and adequate environment for D.,
it was not enough to establish that he deserved sole custody of D.
Being actively involved in one year compared to seven years of life
which Francisco D. could have actively spent with D. if he chose to
proves even more why Kathy should remain the domiciliary parent.
There was not a material change in circumstances by Francisco D.’s
actions, as the Supreme Court concluded. Therefore, Judge Crichton
who concurred with the opinion, but assigned different reasons, was
correct when he explained that Francisco had not changed enough
to be considered integrally involved in D.’s life and that Francisco 
had not even met the threshold of materiality.36 Further, Francisco 
D. had not proved that it would be in the best interest of D. for D. to
stay with Francisco D. as the domiciliary parent. With that being
said, although Kathy is a nonparent, she proved that it was in the
best interest of D. to have her reinstated as the domiciliary parent
for joint custody between her and Francisco D. Kathy further proved
that it can be a custom in society that a nonparent be considered the
one to provide the most adequate and stable environment for a child 
based on the totality of the circumstances, and that a primary judg-
ment of joint custody between a parent and nonparent should be re-
flected in the code.
B. Evidentiary Standard for a Nonparent to Obtain Custody
In Title V, Book I of the Civil Code, for an award of custody to 
parents, article 132 indicates that:
If the parents agree who is to have custody, the court shall
award custody in accordance with their agreement . . . in the
absence of an agreement, or if the agreement is not in the
36. Tracie F., 188 So. 3d at 251-252.
        
 
 
 
           
  
          
         
         
           
      
          
           
          
       
     
     
      
          
          
        
         
            
             
           
          
       
     
         
        
         
       
        
    
     
                                                                                                         
         
     
       
318 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
best interest of the child, the court shall award custody to the
parents jointly.37 
Article 132 further requires that “if custody in one parent is
shown by clear and convincing evidence to serve the best interest of
the child, the court shall award custody to that parent.”38 Article 132
does not consider a nonparent. However, the code does address the
evidentiary standard for a nonparent who is attempting to obtain
joint or sole custody of a child. This standard is codified in Title V,
Book I of the Civil Code in article 133. As article 133 purports:
If an award of . . . sole custody to either parent would result
in substantial harm to the child, the court shall award custody 
to another person with whom the child has been living in a
wholesome and stable environment, or otherwise to any per-
son able to provide an adequate and stable environment.39 
Thus, this means that a nonparent cannot be awarded joint or
sole custody of a child unless the nonparent can prove that the child 
would be in substantial harm with the biological parent. Under these
circumstances, a nonparent does not even have a right of action un-
der article 132 since the nonparent would not be a member of the
class of persons that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the
litigation. This can be an issue for situations where, although the
child may not be in substantial harm, the best interest of the child 
would be to stay with a nonparent, such as a grandparent. Although
the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed joint custody between Fran-
cisco D., a biological parent, and Kathy, a nonparent, from a stipu-
lated judgment, the court failed to address this issue otherwise. This
is an issue that needs to be addressed because it has become custom-
ary in society for grandparents to raise their grandkids.
The upward trend for grandparents raising their grandkids has
been called the “Grandparenting Generation.” Sixty percent of
households that were headed by grandparents in 2014 translated to 
37. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132 (2019).
38. Id.
39. Id. at art. 133.
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2.7 million grandparents being the primary caregiver for their grand-
kids, which is a 7 percent rise from 2009.40 This type of situation
usually occurs when one or both of the biological parents abuse
drugs, abandon the kids, work long hours, or might be involved in
another situation that requires a grandparent to care for the kids so 
that the kids will not be placed in an unstable and inadequate envi-
ronment. Thus, the situation may not always be that the child was
removed from a harmful situation, but it might be in the child’s best
interest for the grandparent to have custody of the child; “Kids who 
are being cared for by relatives also report that they are more likely
to feel like they’re loved, like they are cared about and that they have
that kind of security that is so essential for a child to develop.”41 
When kids are placed in the care of their grandparents, the
grandparents carry majority, if not all, of the responsibilities for their
grandkids. In the instant case, Kathy had assumed the majority of
the responsibilities for D. because it was in D.’s best interest for
Kathy to be the domiciliary parent since D. had been exposed to a
risky situation based on Tracie’s situation. This is important because
although Kathy technically was not D.’s biological parent, Kathy 
played the role of a biological parent in the sense that she had pro-
vided an upbringing for D. which included a stable and adequate
environment. This environment was filled with love, affection, and 
mental, physical, emotional, spiritual and educational growth. Thus,
in this situation, Francisco should have been required to pay Kathy 
child support from the original stipulated judgment since Kathy, alt-
hough a nonparent, had taken the role of a biological parent and 
raised Francisco’s child as if it were her own.
Moreover, it is vital that the code be amended by the Legislature
to reflect this custom and allow parents and nonparents to obtain
joint custody between one another in a primary judgment declared 
40. Alejandra Cancino, More Grandparents Raising Their Grandchildren, 
PBS (2016), https://perma.cc/EU5P-8RGS/.
41. Sarah Jones, The Grandparenting Generation, THE NEW REPUBLIC
(2018), https://perma.cc/HR96-3YC9.
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by the court without the evidentiary standard required to be proven 
by the nonparent in article 133. Although the acquisition of joint
custody was not an obstacle for Kathy, based on the code language
under articles 132 and 133, it could be an obstacle for many other
nonparents who try to obtain custody of a child, including same-sex
couples.42 Unless the parent and nonparent agree to this lower stand-
ard, the lower standard is likely unconstitutional.
In Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme Court held a
Washington statute unconstitutional which permitted any person to 
petition for visitation rights at any time and authorized state superior
courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child’s
best interest.43 Under this statute, the judge accords no deference to
the parent when determining the best interest of the child, but rather
allows the judge to be the only one to decide the best interest of the
child in order to grant visitation rights. Visitation rights entail the
ability for a person to have a right to visit the child under certain
circumstances. On the other hand, custody entails who the child 
should stay with under certain circumstances. Cases dealing with
visitation rights can be used to explain the rights of a parent in a
custody case such as this one because both cases consider the same
underlying principles, including the best-interest-of-the-child stand-
ard. In the Troxel case, the grandparents had filed a petition for vis-
itation rights regarding two of their grandchildren. The mother of
the two girls wanted the grandparents to see the children one week-
end a month (with no overnight stay) with certain holiday visits.
However, the grandparents wanted two weekends a month and two 
full weeks during the summer. The superior court gave no weight to
the mother’s having consented to visitation even before the filing of
any visitation petition or subsequent court intervention. Instead, the
42. Based on the ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges on June 26, 2015, the United
States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the freedom to marry, allowing all same-
sex couples to marry, which ended marriage discrimination across the country,
including in Louisiana; see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607-2608
(2015).
43. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S 57, 72 (2000).
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court rejected the mother’s proposal and settled with a middle
ground, which ordered one week in the summer, one weekend per
month, and time on both of the petitioning grandparents’ birth-
days.44 The U.S. Supreme Court held this unconstitutional. The
court ruled that the statute interfered with the fundamental right of
parents to rear their child’s upbringing. The court further ruled that
parents have the protected right to limit visitation of their children 
with third persons and should be able to choose who their children
are exposed to. Here, the mother had the burden of disproving that
visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters. The court
held this unconstitutional and ruled that a state cannot interfere with
parents’ rights just because the court believes that it can make a bet-
ter decision without showing deference to the parents.45 
The ruling in Troxel v. Granville can be applied in the instant
case because, as stated before, it is a common custom that non-
parents take kids under their wings when a parent has agreed to it
and/or it is in the best interest of the child to do so. A parent should 
have the authorization to decide to share custody of their child with
a nonparent as a fundamental right. However, judges should show
deference to parents’ ideas first when determining the best interest
of a child in a custody case. Besides the judge, it is a parent’s right
to determine the best interest of a child when the parent is able to
make a sound decision based on this protected right that is provided 
to them. There should never be an obstacle for a parent to make a
decision about custody of their child unless it is proven otherwise.
If the parent and nonparent have not agreed to an obstacle for a non-
parent to obtain custody with a parent, a nonparent should be granted
the opportunity to have joint custody with the parent if that is what
the parent wants for the child’s upbringing. Article 133 represents
an obstacle because a nonparent would have to prove harm toward
the child in the custody of a parent to be able to obtain custody. Most
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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parents would not agree to this obstacle based on the current custom.
Thus, the state of Louisiana should recognize this right given to the
parent which has been acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court and
make it easier for parents and nonparents to obtain custody together.
The Louisiana Supreme Court decision in the instant case exem-
plifies how imperative it is that the Louisiana Legislature considers
amending the Civil Code so there is a clear recognition of a parent’s
right to consent to a judgment wherein the parent shares legal custody
of the child with a nonparent. It would have been efficient if the court
would have addressed this issue in the decision; however, the court
made no indication that such a stipulated judgment between a parent
and nonparent would be void. Further, the court in In Re J.E.T. also
granted judgment for a parent to share legal custody with a nonparent.
The court acknowledged that it is foreseeable that because of youth,
complications, or other life circumstances, a parent might agree to a
nonparent being designated as a domiciliary parent. The court further
recognized that there is an applicable burden of proof where the par-
ent has been lucky enough to find such a person with whom to share
joint custody, but later petitions to modify the stipulated award of
joint custody between the parent and nonparent.46 Therefore, it is ob-
vious that courts in Louisiana recognize that nonparents in this society
sometimes take care of children as a matter of custom. Also, it is clear
that these courts support legal custody between a parent and non-
parent in various circumstances, based on the best interest of the child.
Moreover, if the Louisiana Legislature also supported this legal
relationship between a parent and nonparent under article 132, non-
parents would no longer have to fight the article 133 obstacle in order
to provide a stable and adequate environment for children. Without
this obstacle, children can be placed in a comfortable environment
that enhances their educational, spiritual, mental, physical, and emo-
tional growth.
46. In re J.E.T., 211 So. 3d 575, 584 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2016).
